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This article offers an overview of the different types of metaphor
and cognitive abilities that are required in metaphor comprehension.
It does so in connection with the general psycholinguistic and prag-
matic theories of metaphor, which are examined briefly. Attention is
then turned to neuropragmatic functions and the brain in terms of
anatomic structure and functioning. Finally, the article suggests
some relevant areas for future research.
1. Cognitive Linguistics and Conceptual Metaphors
Over the past few decades, research into cognition has revolu-
tionized the concept and role of metaphor, which is no longer seen
as a linguistic device but as a conceptual phenomenon, the output of
a cognitive process by which we understand one domain in terms of
another (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987, 1993).
Metaphors, which are the manifestation of one kind of concep-
tual structure, consist in sets of correspondences1 between two do-
1 Correspondences may be based on: 1) experiential conflation which derives from
the conflation of subjective and sensory experiences (e.g., the subjective experience of
affection is correlated with the physical experience of warmth) (Lakoff and Johnson
1999); 2) physical similarity or resemblance which focuses on the non-literal perception
of shared features and takes place when the two domains share some features which
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mains or conceptual categories. More specifically, a metaphor is a
mapping from a source domain (the conceptual domain from which
we draw the metaphorical expression) to a target one (the concep-
tual domain that we try to understand). Given the cross domain-
mapping and sets of correspondences, knowledge of the target do-
main may be used to understand and reason about the target do-
main in terms of the source (Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal 2002). In
the words of Coulson (2006: 33), metaphors may be considered the
“linguistic representation of underlying conceptual knowledge”
based on our (ability to construe) experience, both personal and
collective.
Within the field of cognitive linguistics, classic thought suggests
that source domains come from our bodily experience and are based
on perception, bodily movements, object manipulation, and pat-
terns of forces acting upon and exerted by us (Fernandez-Duque
and Johnson 1999). According to this view, human beings compre-
hend abstract ideas in terms of bodily experience (spatial movements
and bodily function). This idea is supported by the seminal work of
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Feldman (2006). In their neural
theory of metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson suggest that human con-
cepts are shaped by our bodies, brains and in particular by our sen-
sorimotor system. An embodied concept then is a neural structure,
which is actually part of the sensorimotor system of our brain since
it makes use of the sensorimotor mechanisms of our body and arises
from our bodily interactions with the world. Much conceptual infer-
ence is therefore sensorimotor and its locus is thought to be the
same as that controlling perception and motor control associated
with bodily functions (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).
In Cognitive Linguistics, many metaphors are grounded in the
human perceptual system, which in turn is based on pre-conceptual,
mostly spatial, configurations which allow humans to react to and to
manipulate the world around them. As noted by Dirven and Ruiz
de Mendoza (2010), such configurations, which were labelled by
prompt the metaphoric mapping (Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal 2002); 3) structural simi-
larity (or analogy) which is based on a structural alignment between the representational
elements of the two domains (Gentner et al. 2001).
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image schemas, allow us to categorize “phenomena in the physical
domain and, by means of metaphor, phenomena in concrete do-
mains are used to come to terms with experiences in the more ab-
stract mental domains” (ibid.: 40). An image schema is an embodied
multisensory pre-linguistic structure of experience since image refers
not only to mental, visual imagery but also to kinesthetic (motor)
imagery (Rohrer 2005). This structure seems to play an important
role in metaphor comprehension because it links sensorimotor expe-
rience to conceptualization and language comprehension. As already
observed by Rohrer (2005), in metaphor comprehension the image
schemata of the source domain are mapped onto the target domain.
By way of an example, in a metaphoric expression such as “I found
this theory hard to grasp”, the image schema of the source domain
of object manipulation (grasping) is mapped onto the target domain
of a mental activity (theory). The inference patterns of the source
domain can be used to reason about the target. In terms of Cogni-
tive Linguistics, we understand the meaning of “to grasp a theory”
in exactly the same way that we understand what it means to grasp
an object. This understanding of higher cognition (metaphor and
language comprehension) as emergent from sensory and motor
processes is supported by recent PET and fMRI studies of cognition
(Gallese and Lakoff 2005). Our semantic understanding takes place
via image schemata activating the same cortical areas activated dur-
ing a sensorimotor activity. Sensory regions are, for example, active
during the execution of action, but also during motor imagery
(Matlock, Ramscar and Boroditsky 2005; Coulson 2008). These
studies suggest that the neural substrate of metaphor comprehension
depends on the particular source (e.g., colour concept or motion
one) and target domains of the metaphor (Damasio et al. 1996).
Within Cognitive Linguistics, one common paradigm is based on
the conviction that there is a fundamental unity and interaction
among all cognitive faculties including perception, attention, catego-
rization, conceptualization, affect, memory, reasoning and language
(Dirven and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2010). In particular, this view has
redefined the concept of metaphor by connecting it with cognition
and by promoting the idea that language – including figurative lan-
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guage – contains categories and schemata that represent a cognitive
model of the world (Smith 2008). Although metaphors may be
analyzed from different perspectives,2 in order to better comprehend
the relation between cognition, brain and metaphor comprehension,
in this paper we shall limit our analysis to metaphors based on ana-
logical correspondences (structural similarity) since most metaphor
studies in psychological and neurological literature refer to this kind
of metaphor.
1.1. Theories about Metaphor Structure
“Many metaphors (perhaps most) are essentially analogies”
(Gentner 1983:162) and they are presumably based on analogical
reasoning3 because we understand a new domain by comparing it
with a situation already experienced in the past. So, comprehending
a metaphor of the form an “A is a B” is based on the projection,
through different domains or categories, of images, experiential in-
ferences, and knowledge derived from experience and influenced by
the culture we belong to.
The search for a coherent analogy between two conceptual do-
mains seems to be activated by lexical categories. According to Glucks-
berg and colleagues (1997), metaphors, like comparisons, are inter-
preted as category-inclusion assertions by casting the topic and the
vehicle into a common category. In property attribution terms, in
order to make sense of a metaphor two kinds of knowledge are nec-
essary: 1) a good knowledge of the topic together with its conceptual
extensions; 2) a sufficient knowledge of the vehicle concept in order
to identify the categories it exemplifies. According to this view, one
may infer from a metaphor a category of things that the vehicle ex-
emplifies so as to invest the topic with these properties. This cat-
egory functions as an attributive one providing properties that may
be ascribed to the topic (McGlone 1996). On the other hand, Gibbs
2 For a detailed classification of metaphor types, see Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal
(2002).
3 Analogical reasoning is a kind of reasoning that applies between two specific exem-
plars, in which what is unknown about one exemplar is used to infer new information
about another exemplar (Gentner 1983).
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(1992) suggests that verbal metaphors are not simply instantiations
of temporary, ad hoc categories but reflect pre-existing conceptual
mappings in long-term memory that are metaphorically structured.
These analogical mappings seem to take place in specific mental
spaces having specific roles. According to blending theory (Faucon-
nier and Turner 1998), metaphor comprehension (MC) is based on
a sequential process activated through the creation of mental spaces
which derive conceptual structure from frames representing the rela-
tionship between a topic and the vehicle. In the first phase, two
mental spaces (the topic and the vehicle) are activated in order to
find out the set of similarities between the source and target do-
mains. In the second, the two input mental spaces are projected into
a third one called the blended space, where all the information
about the two domains is conceptually integrated into a single unit
leading to the correct metaphoric meaning. The construction of
these mental spaces is transitory as they are “small conceptual pack-
ets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local under-
standing and action” (ibid.: 137).
A more detailed description of analogical processing in cognitive
and linguistic terms has been given by Gentner (1983). In his view,
analogical processing in metaphor comprehension involves three
main subprocesses: an analogical retrieval, which is the process of
recalling a past situation from long term-memory; an analogical
mapping, which is the core process in analogy and involves the se-
lection and alignment of the correspondences between the two do-
mains; a projection of inferences from the topic to the target and
lastly the evaluation which consists in evaluating the analogical
match and its inferences. These three analogical processes seem to be
guided by the search for both conceptual (in terms of concepts and
ideas) and linguistic (in terms of meanings) coherence.
One theoretical analysis of how an individual may arrive at con-
ceptual and linguistic coherence in metaphor comprehension has
been suggested by Relevance Theory (Wilson and Sperber 2004;
Wilson and Carston 2006). Within this theoretical framework,
metaphor comprehension is guided by the search for relevance,
which is a basic principle of human communication and cognition.
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In relevance-theoretic terms, any external perceptual stimulus or
internal representation (thoughts, memories or conclusions of infer-
ences) which provides an input to cognitive processes may be rel-
evant to an individual at some time in metaphor comprehension
when it connects with background information that yields a positive
cognitive effect (true conclusion). Relevance is assessed in terms of
cognitive effects and processing effort. The greater the processing
effort required, the less relevant the input will be. Keeping process-
ing costs low is automatic, since the human cognitive system has
developed it in order to pick out potentially relevant stimuli from
sensory and semantic memory as well as from inferential activity.
Within this view, metaphor comprehension is an online goal-di-
rected process where the main goal is to find an overall interpreta-
tion that satisfies the presumption of optimal relevance at the lowest
processing cost. To achieve this goal a metaphor interpreter must
enrich the decoded metaphor meaning at the explicit level (from the
encoded concept to the ad hoc one) with tentative hypotheses by
mutually adjusting concepts,4 assigning reference, constructing a
context and deriving contextual implications (conclusions deducible
from the input and context together).
The theories briefly outlined above seem to share the idea that
the central feature of metaphor comprehension of the simple form
“A is B” is analogical reasoning – a process through which a set of
analogical correspondences between two domains are created and
integrated in order to achieve linguistic and conceptual coherence.
The important role of analogical reasoning is supported by recent
research that has found a relationship between analogical reasoning
and ratings of metaphor aptness. Trick and Katz (1996) have ob-
served that subjects with higher analogical reasoning scores give
higher ratings to metaphors whose terms come from dissimilar do-
mains and are more sensitive to the precise structural correspond-
ences between domains. But not all metaphors are alike. Therefore,
before introducing the different cognitive and extra-linguistic factors
4 Within this process a central role seems to be played by lexical narrowing and
broadening that combining give rise to a range of lexicalized senses that yield to an ad-
justed concept or linguistic meaning.
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involved in metaphor comprehension, it is necessary to briefly clas-
sify the different types of metaphors.
2. Conventional and Novel Metaphors
Metaphors may be classified in many ways but generally they are
considered to be either conventional or novel according to two pa-
rameters: 1) the frequency of their use in everyday language; 2) their
level of familiarity in terms of meaning.
A metaphor is conventional when it is so familiar that it has be-
come part of our everyday language (e.g. LIFE IS A WAR). Its compre-
hension does not require a supplementary cognitive effort because its
figurative meaning is an extension of its original literal one. On the
other hand, a metaphor is novel when it conveys new, unfamiliar
meaning. Within this category there are metaphors that have been
created ad hoc in order to define new concepts. Their comprehen-
sion seems to require additional cognitive effort, which is necessary
to understand the set of ontological correspondences used to create
a link between its significant and its meaning (Blasko and Connine
1993). As already observed by McGlone (1996), understanding
novel metaphors may take more time because one must infer the
attributive category that the vehicle exemplifies.
2.1 Cognition Required for Metaphor Comprehension and Contex-
tual Linguistic Factors
According to some theorists, in processing a metaphor of the
form “A is B” such as LAWYERS ARE SHARKS without any contextual
information, any normal individual would follow the following cog-
nitive steps:
1) recognize that this sentence cannot be read literally;
2) transform the sentence, from a syntactic point of view, into a
simile such as “Lawyers are like sharks” relating the two domains.
These two steps are widely supported by scholars such as Ortony
(1979), Gentner (1983) and Miller (1991), who suggest that meta-
phors are first recognized as false assertions and then transformed
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into comparison assertions.
3) Identify the similarities between the source domain (sharks) and
the target one (lawyers) by retrieving all information about the
two domains from his/her long-term memory as pointed out by
the attributive categorization view.5 This step involves different
sub-processes. First of all, working memory (WM) is activated so
as to retrieve from long-term memory shark attributes (predator,
good swimmer, aggressive, tenacious, living in the oceans, having
fins). Within this phase a mental image of the unknown domain
(in this case shark) whose mental image is personal may be re-
trieved from long-term memory. As already observed by Paivio
(1971), mental image retrieval may contribute to comprehending
a linguistic stimulus since it helps an individual to find out infor-
mation about the vehicle that concrete words cannot give.
Finally, the attributes of the metaphor vehicle (shark) that are not
appropriate are suppressed, as suggested by Giora (1997), Gerns-
bacher and Robertson (1999). According to Coulson and Oakley
(2005), in this phase memory plays a central role since the
recruitment of a large stock of background knowledge is necessary in
order to find out all the candidate attributes.
4) Project and adapt the selected qualities (aggressive and tenacious)
of the source domain to the target one (lawyer’s behaviour when
defending a client) as proposed by conceptual blending theory
(Fauconnier and Turner 1998). In this final phase, all the infor-
mation about the domains lead to the correct metaphoric inter-
pretation (lawyers are as aggressive and tenacious as sharks).
On a cognitive level, the search for an analogy between two dif-
ferent domains which share a common concept seems to involve the
activation of different cognitive abilities. For any given metaphor,
comprehension may depend on a multitude of factors, including the
type of metaphor, the sentence context, the distance of the semantic
task, the demands of the task, the verbal ability of the individual, the
5 The term “attributive” category refers to the view by Glucksberg et al. (1997) in
which they consider that metaphors of the form A is B may be conceived as statements
of property attributions (that is, both topic and vehicle may belong to the same category
and may be considered as having the same attributes).
745Metaphor and Brain
working memory (WM) capacity. Moreover, metaphor comprehen-
sion is highly sensitive to extra-linguistic factors such as the amount
of contextual information, the situation where the metaphor occurs,
the listener’s culture (social/cultural level) and his/her experience of
life. The linguistic experience of the individual over time sets up a
semantic network structure that flexibly interacts with contextual
information which may be nonverbal, such as gestures (Cornejo et
al. 2009), but also linguistic, such as a sentence preceded by either
short or long contextual information6 (Inhoff et al. 1984). Such in-
formation facilitates the understanding of abstract expressions such
as those involved in novel metaphors.
Recent neuropragmatic studies on the topic (Kintsch 2000;
Kazmersky et al. 2003; Chiappe and Chiappe 2007) show that the
quality of metaphor comprehension may be influenced by at least
four cognitive capacities: IQ level, working memory capacity, ab-
stract thinking and mental imagery. In the following sections, we
shall examine the literature regarding the role of these four cognitive
capacities in metaphor comprehension. The role of IQ and WM
will be considered in section 2.2 while abstraction and mental im-
agery will be dealt with in 2.3.
2.2 “Metaphoric” Cognitive Abilities: IQ and Memory
A few studies have shown the correlation between metaphor
comprehension and different individual cognitive abilities. One
source of individual differences in metaphor processing may be
linked to a person’s skill in bridging the semantic domains of a topic
and its vehicle,7 as observed by Kazmersky et al. (2003). These au-
thors suggest that a fundamental cognitive factor in metaphor com-
prehension is the IQ level of individuals. In their opinion, low-IQ
subjects may be capable of understanding conventional metaphors
but they may differ on the quality of their interpretations – a possi-
ble explanation could be that they have a smaller vocabulary net-
6 Ortony and colleagues (1978) showed that comprehending metaphoric sentences
in a short context took significantly less time than in a longer context.
7 This ability seems to arise in individuals from the age of 7-8 years old and gradu-
ally increases with his/her age and progress in school (Nikolaenko 2001).
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work as well as a reduced WM capacity leading to less automatic
activation of metaphors. Moreover, the authors suppose that their
ability to interpret a metaphor may also depend on the task de-
mands. Low-IQ subjects will have more difficulty in understanding
metaphors if the task is speeded and/or if it involves not just judging
whether a sentence is metaphoric but also verbally explaining why
and how it is metaphoric.
Another important cognitive factor in metaphor comprehension
is WM (Kintsch 2000; Chiappe and Chiappe 2007). As already
observed by Cohen et al. (1997), WM is responsible for the short-
term storage and online manipulation of information necessary for
higher cognitive functions such as language, problem solving and
comparison operations. Moreover, according to Baddley’s (2003)
multimodal model, WM has different executive functions such as
directing attention to relevant information (suppressing what is irrel-
evant), coordinating cognitive processes when more than one task is
required, constructing and manipulating visual images as well as the
supervision of information integration. Recent research (Blasko
1999; Kintsch 2000; Chiappe and Chiappe 2007) has shown that
individual differences in WM capacity and its executive functions
may affect metaphor comprehension. These studies lead us to be-
lieve that high-WM individuals may produce better interpretations
of novel metaphors in terms of quality and speed than low-WM
ones. This empirical fact squares well with the way mental spaces are
argued to be operational since they are “knowledge packets, derived
from our long-term knowledge store (Long-Term Memory), and
used provisionally and in combination with other mental spaces for
the purpose of performing certain cognitive operations” (Ruiz de
Mendoza and Santibáñez 2003: 294) which take place in our WM.
Indeed, as already observed by Coulson and Matlock (2001), meta-
phor comprehension requires coordinating conceptual structure in
order to apprehend the set of correspondences between two domains
involving the construction of a blended space in which structure
from each of these inputs can be integrated. The blended space in-
herits goals of the two domains and the inference arises when these
structures are integrated to create a hypothetical structure with both
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characteristics. They suggest that integration involves three proc-
esses: 1) composition (attribution of a relation from one space to
other elements from the other input spaces); 2) completion, which
occurs when structure in the blend matches information from Long-
Term Memory; 3) elaboration, which involves mental simulation of
the event represented in the blend (for example, in visual imagery,
the comprehender mentally imagines the scene). These assumptions
seem to suggest that mental spaces are the blending theory of WM
in Psychology, since blending appeals to a conceptual integration
network where WM seems to play a central role in metaphor com-
prehension. So, individual differences in IQ level and WM capacity
may provide functional limitations in terms of speed and efficiency
in metaphor comprehension. Unfortunately, there have been few
studies that have concentrated on the role of the different WM ex-
ecutive functions in metaphor comprehension.
2.3 Abstraction and Mental Imagery
Another fundamental factor in metaphor comprehension is ab-
straction. Kircher et al. (2007) define abstract thinking as the hu-
man ability to think beyond the concrete facts or rather to go be-
yond the literal meaning of the words. Yang et al. (2010) claim that
in metaphor comprehension abstract thought refers to: 1) the execu-
tive control processes necessary to detect multiple possible semantic
interpretations of a linguistic statement; 2) the ability to override a
literal meaning in favour of a broader symbolic one. In line with
these assumptions, the ability to abstract concepts in metaphor com-
prehension means the capability: 1) to recognize instantly that a sen-
tence is not meant to be taken literally but metaphorically; 2) to
identify the similarities between the source and target domains; 3) to
isolate the partial quality of the object-source after retrieving from
our memory the chains of abstraction or the different constituents of
our semantic abstraction. Therefore, mental imagery reflects figura-
tive understanding and the individual’s tacit awareness of underlying
metaphoric concepts, and develops with age (Duthie et al. 2008).
Another important cognitive factor involved in this process is the
reproduction of a mental image while processing a metaphor. In
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psychology, a mental image is usually described as being associated
with a word within our long-term memory. Considering, for exam-
ple, the word “tree”, even if this semantic category may include dif-
ferent types of tree such as the bald cypress, the oak tree, and the
pine tree, a personal image of the word “tree” may be represented by
only one of these types of tree (e.g. the pine). Moreover, memory
registers it with its multisensory components (visual, olfactive, tac-
tile, gustatory) as well as other features such as the shape and the
location (related situational event). This image is personal because it
is directly linked to episodic memory, which represents our knowl-
edge of the world built up on the grounds of everyday experience.
Kosslyn and colleagues (1995) suggest that mental images are a fun-
damental part of human thought and play a central role in abstract
thinking and language comprehension. They affirm that people of-
ten use imagery to recall information when processing a linguistic
stimulus since mental images have perceptual properties that verbal
material has not. According to them, imagery can help one to better
comprehend verbal descriptions. So, following these assumptions we
may suppose that imagery, with its perceptual properties, works in
concert with verbal knowledge in order to process vehicles that can-
not easily be inferred from verbal material.
3. Neuropragmatics and Hemispheric Involvement in Metaphor Com-
prehension Processing
Neuropragmatics deals with how the brain comprehends and
produces verbal pragmatic behaviour or rather how an individual
makes choices and inferences in order to convey a specific meaning
in a particular context (Stemmer 2000; Bertuccelli Papi and Baicchi
2008). Following Bambini (2010), the main goals of neuroprag-
matics are: 1) to examine “how brain represents beliefs, knowledge
and components of context in order to infer speaker’s meanings and
to engage in successful communication” (ibid.: 2) since the commu-
nicative use of language (in terms of production and comprehen-
sion) is deeply influenced by our knowledge, beliefs, mental and
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emotional states; 2) to investigate the underlying neural basis of our
pragmatic abilities such as perceiving and filtering information, in-
tegrating incoming linguistic stimuli with a precise goal, planning
and monitoring behaviour (e.g., appreciating another person’s
thoughts and beliefs), providing coherent feedback in terms of con-
cepts and meanings. So, the goal of neuropragmatics is to better
understand the functional architecture of the brain networks acti-
vated by specific pragmatic behaviour and processes (e.g., figurative
language and humour comprehension and production).
Within neuropragmatics studies on metaphor comprehension
there are two main approaches, the experimental and the clinical
one. The former concentrates on studies conducted on healthy sub-
jects (e.g., Eviatar and Just 2006; Rapp et al. 2004; Mashal et al.
2007) while the latter concentrates on studies conducted on diseased
subjects (e.g., Gagnon et al. 2003; Kircher et al. 2007; Nikolaenko
2001). Both approaches use imaging techniques and/or Event-Re-
lated Potentials (ERPs). These techniques give information about
the brain regions and the strength of their interconnections during a
cognitive performance task. They have a low-temporal resolution
because they aggregate brain activity over a few seconds, whereas
ERPs possess a high-temporal resolution and provide a continuous
temporal measure of the electric neural brain activity during the
task. In particular, the amplitude of N400 wave seems to play an
important role in identifying the semantic integration process. This
negative voltage deflection has been found to be larger in cases in
which semantic integration is more difficult (Coulson 2006).
Early research in metaphor comprehension supported the selec-
tive role of the Right Hemisphere (RH) in this process. The RH was
assumed to have a selective and significant role in controlling prag-
matics and specific forms of language such as jokes, metaphors, indi-
rect requests, irony and lexical ambiguity. RH recruitment in meta-
phor comprehension has been explained in two ways: Giora’s Gradi-
ent Salient Hypothesis (GSH) and Beeman’s Coarse Semantic cod-
ing. Giora (1997) suggested that RH involvement may vary as a
function of familiarity with the linguistic stimuli. In her view, the
comprehension of figurative and literal language is governed by the
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general principle of salience. The degree of meaning salience of a
linguistic stimulus is based on its conventionality, experiential fa-
miliarity, frequency and prototypicality. Highly salient metaphors
(conventional) have unconditional priority over less salient ones.
They are directly coded in the mental lexicon and are easily accessed.
By contrast, non-salient meanings such as those of novel metaphors
are not coded in the mental lexicon because their meaning is unfa-
miliar. The GSH predicts a selective RH involvement in the process-
ing of novel metaphors having non-salient meanings, and a LH in-
volvement in the processing of conventional metaphors having sali-
ent meanings (Rapp et al. 2004).
In contrast, Beeman’s (1998) semantic coding model suggested
that in metaphor comprehension each hemisphere activates semantic
information differently. The LH is concerned with the fine-coding
of semantic information by selectively and strongly activating small
semantic fields for understanding more frequent or contextually rel-
evant meaning (conventional metaphor), whereas the RH coarsely
codes semantic information diffusely activating distant semantic
fields. These studies suggest that when people successfully integrate
very distant associations the RH temporal areas are deeply involved.
So, RH coarse semantic coding is useful for noting and integrating
distantly related semantic information (novel metaphors).8 But be-
cause “the RH is poor at selecting information for further process-
ing, it is the LH that selects inferences and incorporates them”
(Beeman 1998: 279). Thus, both hemispheres turn out to be en-
gaged in semantic processing, but they do so differently (Arzouan et
al. 2007). RH involvement seems to be highly correlated with novel
metaphors, whereas LH involvement seems to be highly correlated
with conventional ones. However, the exact functional organization
of these hemispheres still remains unclear.
8 In particular, it seems that the right Post Superior Temporal Sulcus (PSTS) plays
a special role in the comprehension of novel metaphors since it recruits a special net-
work which is involved in the processing of two-word novel metaphoric expressions as
compared to conventional metaphors. This region, in fact, is activated when subjects
solve creative problems especially with insight (Beeman 1998).
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3.1 Brain Areas and Metaphor Comprehension
Many studies of metaphor processing have focused on investigat-
ing hemispheric lateralization and novelty effects during interpreta-
tion of novel or unusual metaphors (Yang et al. 2009). According to
Beeman (1998) and Giora (1997), the LH is activated if high salient
meanings or close semantic relationships are processed; by contrast,
RH is activated if distant semantic relationships and low-familiar
meanings are processed. Other studies disagree with this theory sug-
gesting that when an individual processes a metaphor (both conven-
tional and novel) it seems that both hemispheres work in concert in
a complex and dynamic process (Arzouan et al. 2007).
These contradictory findings may be due to differences in the lin-
guistic stimuli and task demands used in the various studies. Most
of the studies concentrate on comparing conventional versus novel
metaphors but the linguistic stimuli used in the various experiments
present different degrees of complexity and determine different
hemispheric involvement (for a detailed meta-analysis on this issue,
see Kacinik and Chiarello 2007).
According to Gagnon et al. (2003), RH involvement in metaphor
comprehension could depend on syntactic complexity more than on
novelty. The use of a complex expression such as “The policeman
who didn’t give straight answers was jumping ditches” (Rapp et al.
2004: 399) may activate brain regions involved in complex syntactic
processing – on a sentence level – which are not activated when
processing simple metaphoric sentences such as “my alarm clock is a
torture” (ibid.: 399). Moreover, besides different brain area
activations,9 processing single metaphoric meanings may reflect dif-
ferent cognitive abilities than those involved in processing simple or
complex metaphorical sentences (Gagnon et al. 2003).
A further factor which may bring about different results is the
type of demands (semantic judgments, plausibility judgments,
imageability tasks, valence tasks). A valence task,10 for example, will
9 Within the RH, the gyri involved in complex syntactic processing seem to be the
right superior and middle temporal gyri (Gagnon et al. 2003).
10 In a valence task participants are asked to give to the item a positive or negative
connotation.
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involve paralinguistic factors, such as social information which is not
required when performing an imageability task.
Recent neuroimaging literature points out that laterality and neu-
ral activation in metaphor processing may be influenced by task in-
structions. Moreover, metaphor comprehension is highly sensitive to
the context as previously observed. For example, in a conversational
context, body expressions, speaker’s gestures and facial expressions
may influence comprehension. Contextual features like these may be
part of the global sense of metaphoric expressions and they require
the ability to interpret the speaker’s intentionality as well as the in-
tegration of gestural information. Finally, statistical samples are al-
most always composed of a small number of participants and they
are heterogeneous in terms of age and language spoken. As a conse-
quence of these methodological difficulties, establishing a direct and
precise correspondence between metaphor processing and brain area
activations is quite difficult because of the heterogeneity of the pre-
vious studies and the techniques employed.
3.2 Brain Areas and Language Functions
Basic language functions, such as processing and production, are
normally associated with the LH. Within the LH, the anterior part
controls phonology and syntax and the posterior part controls se-
mantics (Soroker 2005). In particular, the Left Inferior Frontal
Gyrus (LIFG) seems to support multiple functions such as the
processing of varying word orders, semantic and phonological
processing as well as semantic selection, thus allowing comprehenders
to select concepts in order to build up their mental representation of
natural language input (Beeman 1998). The thalamus may serve as
a moderator that coordinates language processing with other regions
since its pulvinar is connected to the language-relevant areas of the
cortex (parietal, temporal, occipital and frontal cortex). The RH, on
the contrary, seems to have a selective role in controlling pragmatics,
speech prosody, and metaphor, as well as in the control of humour
(Soroker 2005).
As far as interhemispheric communication is concerned, the cor-
pus callosum (see figure 1) seems to play a crucial role in metaphor
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comprehension. Recent studies have demonstrated that patients with
agenesis of the corpus callosum have a deficit in understanding con-
ventional metaphors and emotional prosody (Eviatar and Just
2006). These authors suggest that such patients have difficulty in
transferring complex information from one hemisphere to the other
probably because this brain region has the main function of con-
necting the two hemispheres and sharing information through it.
Figure 1 – Anatomic region of the brain concerned with speech and thought
3.3 Brain Areas: Memory
As far as memory is concerned it seems that the hippocampal
system is responsible for retrieval of episodic memory. A bilateral
hippocampal lesion determines an inability to deposit information
elaborated in the WM into long-term memory. The left prefrontal
cortex, in particular the dorsal part, seems to play an important role
in the maintenance of information in WM. Moreover, activations in
the left prefrontal cortex reflect a domain-specific semantic WM
capacity when an individual makes a semantic judgment (concrete
vs. abstract) while left posterior parts are involved in phonological
WM.
The RH, on the contrary, seems to be deeply involved in carry-
ing out difficult processes such as distant semantic meanings and
mental images which are difficult to reproduce or when retrieving
Tatiana Canziani754
and elaborating paralinguistic information as well as in specific WM
tasks. In particular, within the RH, the right thalamus is recruited
when processing novel metaphors which are difficult to understand;
the right para-hippocampal region reflects the processing of para-
linguistic elements such as the retrieval of social information neces-
sary in valence tasks; the right prefrontal cortex is, on the contrary,
involved in spatial WM.
3.4 Analogical Reasoning: Abstract Thinking and Reasoning
Recent research in this field seems to demonstrate that, as far as
abstract thinking is concerned, two main brain areas may be in-
volved in this process: the LIFG and the angular gyrus (see figure 2).
A study was conducted on schizophrenic patients who normally
have a specific figurative language deficit probably linked to an in-
ability of abstract thinking (Kircher et al. 2007). These patients are
prone to over-abstract concepts giving interpretations which are de-
tached from reality. This dysfunction is due to an altered activation
in the inferior frontal gyrus. It seems that one of the specific roles of
the LIFG could be to perform selection in the face of competing
words as supported by recent studies which observed LIFG activa-
tion when one of the multiple meanings of an ambiguous word can
be ultimately selected and integrated (Grindrod et al. 2008).
A second gyrus which seems to be deeply involved in metaphori-
cal abstract thinking is the angular one. Right-handed patients with
left angular gyrus damage were found to have gross deficits in un-
derstanding even familiar metaphors (Ramachadram and Hubbard
2003). The abstractness of metaphors escaped them completely
since they gave responses that were literal rather than metaphoric.
Ramachadram and Hubbard (2003) offered an explanation, suggest-
ing that this region is a seat of polymodal convergence of sensory
information because it is at the crossroads of areas specialized for
processing sensory inputs (touch, hearing and vision). It seems then
that the LIFG and the angular gyrus play a crucial role in forming
abstract concepts in metaphor comprehension.
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Figure 2 – Anatomic regions of the brain involved in metaphor comprehension
3.5 Mental Imagery
Forming a mental image when processing a conventional meta-
phor activates specific brain regions different from those activated
when processing a novel metaphor (Yang et al. 2009). In their study
Yang et al. (2009) asked participants to form a mental image of a
conventional or novel metaphoric sentence and to figure out what
the sentence meant while they measured different areas of the brain
using fMRI techniques. Their data support the idea that conven-
tional metaphors consistently recruited the left middle temporal
gyrus, the right fusiform and the temporal and inferior frontal gyri.
They suggest that the left middle temporal gyrus is involved when
forming a mental image of a learned metaphor (concrete); on the
contrary, the right fusiform is related to the integration of visual and
semantic information.
Novel metaphors, on the other hand, consistently activated the
left fusiform gyrus and the right precuneus. An increased activation
in the right precuneus probably reflects the difficulty in forming a
mental image when processing abstract concepts and novel meta-
phors as well as the reinstatement of visual images associated with
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remembered words (Fletcher et al. 1995). Thus, the right precuneus
is probably responsible for the retrieval of information from long-
term episodic memory when processing novel metaphors (Cavanna
and Trimble 2006). As a matter of fact, the precuneus is responsible
for a wide range of cognitive functions such as visuo-spatial imagery,
episodic memory retrieval and self-processing. Gibbs, (2006) sug-
gested that imagining appropriate body actions facilitates processing,
which is likely due to the activation of relevant pre-motor and mo-
tor cortex regions during mental imagery of the relevant actions. It
seems that both hemispheres contribute in different degrees to meta-
phor comprehension.
4. Conclusions
In conclusion, metaphor comprehension is a complicated process
deeply influenced by cognitive, linguistic and extra-linguistic factors.
Each of these factors influences the way an individual processes a
simple or complex metaphoric sentence having a salient or non-sali-
ent meaning. Analogical reasoning is thought to determine the com-
prehension of metaphors in the form “A is B” and may involve dif-
ferent cognitive abilities. Unfortunately, it is quite impossible to es-
tablish a precise correspondence between brain areas and metaphor
processing because most neuropragmatic studies are heterogeneous
in terms of linguistic stimuli, task demands, the techniques used and
the situational context. Moreover, neuropragmatic studies have left
many metaphor types such as the conflation ones out of the picture.
This kind of metaphor (e.g., primary ones linked with subjective
emotional states – such as love, affection etc.) may, in fact, provide
a useful tool for further research since they link the judgemental and
emotional parts of our brain with the experiential one. Thus, a more
rigorous approach to neuropragmatic experiments is necessary in-
cluding helpful cooperation between linguists and neurologists in
order to build up homogeneous linguistic stimuli and situational
context.
Brain mapping of human cognition has few facts to guide the
757Metaphor and Brain
formation of hypotheses because of its complicated and multiple
neural interconnections. Consequently, new studies on metaphor
comprehension should be designed, concentrating on the role of the
different basic cognitive abilities involved in the process. Further
research on this topic should provide new insights for other scien-
tific domains such as L2 learning/teaching in optimizing L2 learning
processes (in specialized and non-specialized discourse) as well as in
Translation Studies simplifying accurate translation. As far as L2
learning/teaching is concerned, the Cognitive Model, as already
observed by Ruiz de Mendoza (2008), offers a powerful analytical
tool, which besides being sensitive to neurobiological and psycho-
logical validation, may allow L2 learners to systematically capture
internal and external language similarities and differences where the
two languages differ considerably since this view helps us to under-
stand how domains are set up mentally and to what extent that rela-
tion is grounded in our bodily nature. Pedagogical applications may
also extend to L2 learning/teaching in specialized discourse such as
economics as already observed by Charteris-Black and Ennis (2001).
The authors suggest that a better understanding of the similarities
and differences in metaphor use between source and target language
may lead to better understanding on the part of students as well as a
better L2 writing.
With regard to Translation Studies, as already observed by
Schaeffner (2004), an analysis of the cognitive processes in the trans-
lator’s mind during a translation act could test whether translators
(as text receivers and interpreters) “access conceptual metaphors
when constructing interpretations of metaphorical expressions and
how this might influence the decision-making for the target text”
(2004: 1258). Finally, new neuropragmatic studies should concen-
trate on investigating the close relationship between mirror neurons
and metaphor understanding since the mirror circuits provide a
natural substrate for the embodiment of language via image sche-
mata. The recent discovery of mirror neurons (Di Pellegrino et al.
1996; Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolati and Arbit 1998) has, in fact,
provided new insights into the study of the role of the motor system
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in language reception, processing and comprehension, suggesting a
close association between gesture and metaphor comprehension
(Corballis 2010).
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